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SUGGESTED REFORMS
IN THE PROCEDURE
IN SMALL CLAIMS COURTS
By JUDGE A. M. CARTER*
One of the areas of study in which the Ontario Law Reform Commission
is presently engaged is the structure of the Small Claims Courts. There can be
no doubt that substantial change is needed with a view to the provision of
(to use the language in the terms of reference of the overall study by the Commission) "more convenient, economic and efficient disposal of civil business"'
in the approximately 200 Small Claims Courts that presently exist in Ontario.
Undoubtedly a large number of these Courts could be closed or consolidated
with some considerable saving of expense in the total administration costs of
maintaining these Courts. The purpose of this article is, however, to suggest
changes in practice and procedure, rather than to concern itself with the
strictly administrative or management side of the matter.
First of all, the Courts are presided over, as required by the governing
statute,2 by County Court Judges federally appointed, and it is worthy of note
that only one other province in Canada, New Brunswick, follows this practice.
In Ontario there is one provincially appointed Small Claims Court Judge,3 and
something less than ten retired County Court Judges who act as part-time
Judges in these Courts, chiefly in the larger areas. The practice of appointing
solicitors in isolated cases, although still resorted to in some counties, is
becoming less frequent for a number of reasons, but chiefly one of economics.
There is no provision for paying solicitors who act as delegates of the ordinarily
presiding County Judge, and in any event it does entail a considerable sacrifice
of time and money for a solicitor to accept such responsibility with any frequency. On the other hand, it is only with frequency of experience that a
solicitor can render efficient and effective service in this capacity. From another
viewpoint, the feeling that once may have existed that it was an honour to be
asked to undertake this duty, even on a single occasion, has largely been dissipated by the mood of the times. At the same time, the very considerable increase
in jurisdiction now possessed by the County Court in its own right has also made
it increasingly difficult for the greater number of County Judges who preside
over Small Claims Courts to spare the time required to properly meet the convenience of the public and preserve the general feeling of a fair and full hearing
* Judge
1

of the County Court of the County of Simcoe.

Terms of Reference issued by the Minister of Justice and the Attorney General for
Ontario to the Law Reform Commission engaged in reviewing the present system of Courts.
2 B.N.A. Act 1867, 30 & 31 Victoria c. 3 s. 96(U.K.).
3 The Province of Ontario has concurrent jurisdiction with the Federal Government
to appoint Small Claims Court Judges, see The Small Claims Court Act RS.O. 1970,
c.439, s. 11.
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that is the chief desire of the litigant who wants to have his day in Court, with
little concern for others with whom he must compete at the same Sittings of the
Court. The Presiding Judge at a Small Claims Court (i.e. the larger Courts,
approximately 100 or one-half of the total number) is, and has been for several
years past, ina continuing dilemma, torn between allowing cases to run their full
length, particularly where counsel represent one or both parties, thereby causing
many cases to be put over month after month without being heard, or deliberately shortening the time allotted for each case in order to dispose of as many
cases as possible on the usually single day allotted per month for trials. In the
latter course of action, both litigants and their counsel, if any, are quite often
aggravated at not having been given their inherent right of a full day in Court.
To meet the first problem of providing more time where needed for more
complete hearings and less inconvenience caused by delayed trials, it is suggested that consideration be given to the appointment, at least in the counties
where need can be shown to exist, of duly qualified solicitors, preferably with
experience in litigation and of at least ten years standing at the Bar, as part-time
Judges with jurisdiction exclusive to the Small Claims Courts in their respective
municipality or county at most, at a per diem allowance of a reasonable nature,
perhaps $50 - $100, and within certain limitations, power to set additional days
for Sittings where required, in order to give at least a fairer proportion of time
to each case than currently is possible under the present system. At the same
time, such a system would free the County Judge so relieved for more
important duties at his own Court level and would provide excellent training
and experience for lawyers who might later be considered for a full-time judicial
appointment.
The next area which warrants the application of a different and yet old
concept is the non-appealable division. A generation ago, when the pressures
were not nearly so great, or the case lists so long, the concept of the "Poor Man's
Court" or the Layman's Court" was recognized much more visibly than it is
today, and the format was understandably different in non-appealable cases in
that lawyers seldom participated, and the parties simply told their "story" to the
Judge who applied his mind, without over-concern about the rules of either
procedure or evidence, to the equities of the matter, and gave quick judgments
based on common sense and the guiding principle of Division Courts (as they
were known then), namely, that they were Courts of equity and good conscience.
Today there are many cases in which parties are represented by counsel or
agents, and more and more motor negligence cases being contested by insurance
companies who, much more frequently of late, refuse to settle, and are quite
content to spend more money on legal representation than on the claim itself.
Surely, at least in cases involving not more than $100, a return to the old
custom of the parties relating their respective sides of the case to the Judge,
without assistance from any representation, professional or otherwise, could
save considerable time and expense, and be much more convenient to the
persons involved. In such a category, the proposal here is that parties would
not be allowed representation. While it is true that the majority of cases under
$100 seldom have counsel engaged, there are some that do, and in several
Courts, credit bureau agents are acting in the capacity of agent for one party,
usually the plaintiff. In the writer's personal view, the ban on representation
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might very well be imposed on cases up to the present non-appealable limit of
$200, but at least it should clearly be warranted in cases up to $100.
It is difficult to suggest any real change in procedure or practice in the
appealable case division of the Small Claims Courts. It may be that the monetary
jurisdiction of $400 (except in the Districts where it is $800) has become
too limiting in terms of the number of cases to be dealt with, in most Courts
throughout the province, in a single day. Certainly in motor negligence cases,
unless a completely separate Court or tribunal is established solely for the trial
or hearing in such cases, it is impossible to reconcile the advantage, other than
costs, of bringing a $400 repair bill into Small Claims Court and getting a
rushed trial in the less than sufficient time likely to be allotted for any individual
case, being only one of several to be heard the same day, over the alternative,
for any case over $400, of having at least half a day for trial in the County
Court, without the risks inherent in the Small Claims practice, dictated by the
system of administration. The truth is that the amount of damages involved
does not have any relationship to the amount of time required for a proper
trial, and yet more and more of these cases are being contested in Small Claims
Courts, often with a slight excess in damages over the jurisdiction being abandoned, with legal representation on both sides, with considerable extra cost and
inconvenience to all persons involved as parties, witnesses or counsel, due to
the lack of adequate time available for the disposition of so much business. In
some counties, counsel who are involved in cases where the issues are complicated, or there are many witnesses (such as in Third Party proceedings) have
been asking for special dates for trial so that they will be ensured of a fixed
time for hearing and not exposed to the risk of several adjournments on regular
or statutory Sittings days. There are are very few counties now where the
County Judge (or Judges) has any additional time to devote to extra Sittings
for Small Claims cases. The answer seems to be in the creation of special parttime Judges who can devote the necessary time to ensure fair and full hearings
in appealable cases to the same extent and virtually the same procedure as in
County Court, and possibly as well to increase the monetary jurisdiction to
$700 -$800.
There is one area or division of the Small Claims Court jurisdiction that
has greatly changed, and indeed lost most of its effectiveness in the past three
years due to the removal from the Small Claims Courts Act of the power of the
Court to deal meaningly with show cause summonses or to enforce defauilt
orders of the Court. In 1968-9 Statutes of Ontario, c. 30, Sections 131 and 132
of the Division Courts Act (as it then was) were amended whereby the Court
can no longer consider whether there is any wilful default under a previous
Court Order for payment, and can no longer commit a debtor to jail for such
act of wilful default. The apparent intention of the legislature in passing this
amendment was to remove the objection that the Courts were still putting people
in jail for non-payment of debts and that, even in these enlightened times, there
did indeed still exist a "debtor's prison". Until this amendment, it was within
the power of the Judge to imprison persons shown to have wilfully defaulted
in paying off judgments as directed by a previously issued Order of the Court
after such persons had been given the opportunity to show cause for not having
complied with a previous Order of the Court respecting payment of the judg-
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ment. It would be interesting to study the figures, if they are available, as to how
many times imprisonment for this reason has occurred in the decade preceding
the amendment in question. It is submitted here that it was a power very
sparingly exercised, and only in cases of flagrant and repeated violations of
this kind. The fact that such power existed, however, was the means whereby
many judgments were recovered at least in part, from debtors who would
otherwise have never paid or even made any real effort to satisfy such debts.
However commendable the deprivation of this power may be in terms of social
advancement, the results since have clearly rendered the Court impotent in
terms of enforcing orders that it still has the power to make and the exercise of
which power is still the main purpose of such proceedings. The purpose of a
show cause summons, still in use notwithstanding the amendment, is quite
meaningless and ineffective in execution, unless it is thought to have some
psychological influence on a debtor who might not be aware that the Court does
not in fact have the power to enforce orders for payment on account of judgments outstanding. The Court may still provide, to the extent permitted in the
discretion of the Presiding Judge, for an inquiry into other means of relief or
potential income available to the judgment creditor against the debtor being
examined, but such an inquiry is nothing more or less than an examination and
does not surely require the presence or supervision of a Judge for such limited
purpose. If the Court does make an order for payment against the debtor, and
the debtor fails to pay or becomes in default, as the case may be, there is
absolutely nothing the Court can do about such situation, and which in many
cases would amount to clear contempt of Court, for which no punishment at all
exists. The effectiveness of an order now made for payment, whether on consent
or by the Court's own volition, depends entirely on the conscience of the debtor
who knows or is likely to know that the order cannot be enforced.
Creditors, through their agents and/or solicitors, are becoming increasingly aware of this situation, and the number of judgment summonses issued is
in rapid decline throughout much of the province. In point of fact, the sole
function of the Court in this respect is now solely to put some semblance of
judicial authority on a consent order for payment often on terms volunteered by
the debtor, and of a minimal amount, with the creditor being quite dissatisfied,
the debtor knowing the order means nothing, and the Court thoroughly frustrated at the ineffectiveness of such procedure. Surely if such a procedure is to
become effective in any way, it is by way of assuring the debtor that so long as
he meets the terms of a voluntary settlement, other legal remedies will not be
used against him for the recovery of the same debt. Such consent orders as are
sought could be arranged under the supervision of the Clerk of the Court who
should have the power to effectively subpoena parties to an action for the
purpose of requiring their attendance and discussion. County Court Judges
being relieved from having any part to play in this process, could expend the
time saved quite usefully to the conduct of trials in their respective Small Claims
Courts and also be spared the potential humiliation which threatens them at the
present time of having to acknowledge that they do not possess the power to
enforce any order for payment made by them in these proceedings. Alternatively, it surely is unreasonable that Judges should ignore the limitation on their
powers in this respect and be any longer required to make orders other than on
4 strictly consent basis, with a clear indication being given at the time of making
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such orders to both the debtor and the creditor of the inability to enforce such
orders in the event of default.
In summary, the recommendations for the reform in some areas of Small
Claims Courts are these:
1. The appointment of lawyers as part-time Judges to relieve the workload in
the busier counties and districts.
2. The creation of a separate division of non-appealable cases involving up
to $100 wherein only the parties to the action personally may appear
in Court, i.e. without legal or other representation.
3. An increase in monetary jurisdiction for motor negligence cases, but only
in the event special Courts presided over by part-time Judges are made
available for this purpose.
4. The removal of judgment summonses from the Judge's responsibility, with
the provision for consent orders only being within the jurisdiction of the
Clerk of the Court who should be given the power to subpoena necessary
parties.

